Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem by Wilson, R. E. & Riccio, J. R.
im
E
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
=
W
W
_YSIS OF THE
__ _RUST
_OR __OL
_ATOR SU_YS_M
21 N_MBER 1986
i
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900001613 2020-03-20T00:59:40+00:00Z
DUm
m
m
m
IB
um
m
I
Bo
mw
D
lure
J
m
Z
g
mJ _
m
I
m_
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY
HOUSTON DIVISION
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT
WORKING PAPER NO. 1.0-WP-VA86001-06
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ANALYSIS OF THE ASCENT THRUST VECTOR CONTROL ACTUATOR SUBSYSTEM
£
w
L
w
r_
i
L
i
r_
w
21 November 1986
This working Paper is Submitted to NASA under
Task Order No. VA86001, Contract NAS 9-17650
PREPARED BY: ____/
R,E. Wilson
Senior Analyst
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
J.R. Riccio
ME Actuator Lead
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
• k_,/, # p_
///' v i
Technical Manager
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
APPROVED BY: _/__
W.F. Huning _anagerDeputy Program
STSEOS
=
IIR
m
I
g
g
U
MB
I
I
m
Hi
m
_m
w
mm _
m _
m
EB _
wB
w
w
J
CO_E_S
Page
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
2.0 INTRODUCTION 5
2.1 Purpose 5
2.2 Scope 5
2.3 Analysis Approach 5
2.4 Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuator
Subsystem Ground Rules and Assumptions 6
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION 7
3.1 Design and Function 7
3.2 Interfaces and Locations 8
3.3 Hierarchy 9
4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS 16
4.1 Analysis Results - Servoactuator 17
4.2 Analysis Results - Hydraulic Valve Module 17
4.3 Analysis Results - Primary Piston Assembly 18
5 •0 REFERENCES 19
APPENDIX A ACRONYMS A-1
APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS B-1
B.1 Definitions B-2
B.2 Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions B-4
B.3 Subsystem Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions B-6
APPENDIX C DETAILED ANALYSIS C-I
APPENDIX D POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS D-I
m
L_
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Table
Table
List of Figures
1 - ATVC ELECTROHYDRAULIC SERVOACTUATOR SUMMARY
2 - TYPICAL ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
3 - ATVC SERVOACTUATOR BLOCK DIAGRAM
4 - SWITCHING VALVE
S - ELECTROHYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
6 - BYPASS VALVE
7 - POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSEMBLY
8 - CYLINDER AND PISTON/RAM ASSEMBLY
List of Tables
I - SUMMARY OF IOA FAILURE MODES
AND CRITICALITIES
II - SUMMARY OF IQA POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
Page
2
3
l0
ii
12
13
14
15
Page
16
17
g
z
mm
m
mm
U
m
mm
m
l
mm
m
mm
m
J
m
mm
m
u
i
m
m
u
mm
ii
mm
m
Ww
_Z
Ez
m
r
w
w
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuator Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i00ctobe-r 1986. The IOA
a-_roach features a _- o_n _n-al_is of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control
(ATVC) Actuator hardware.
The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC)
is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight
path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB
nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation,
the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There
are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw
for each of the three main engines.
Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic
servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve
assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve.
The IOA analysis process utilized available hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware .assemblies, components, and
hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
Figures 1 and 2 presents a summary of the failure criticalities
for each of the major elements of the Main Engine Servoactuator.
A summary of the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also
presented below with Hardware (H) criticality first and
Functional (F) criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Numbereriticality: ]1/l: 9 2/1R7 2/2_ 3/1R1 3/2R]3/3_ 9 TOTAL26
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Figure ATVC ELECTROHYDRAULIC SERVOACTUATOR SUMMARY
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Figure 2 - TYPICAL ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Number : 9 m -- -- 16
m
m
m
Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly
due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and
mechanical failures.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Ste_ 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
!.l Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 ATVC Actuator Ground Rules and Assumptions
1
The ATVC Actuator definitions, ground rules, and assumptions used
in the IOA are defined in Appendix B.I and B.2. There were no
subsystem specific ground rules and assumptions used in the
analysis.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The ATVC servoactuators gimbal the main engines in pitch and yaw
to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent.
There are two Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) actuators for
each ME, one for pitch movement and one for yaw movement. Each
actuator receives four command voltages, one from each ATVC
driver electronics channel. Each actuator employs two of the
three Orbiter hydraulic systems (one primary and one secondary).
Each METVC servoactuator consists of the following components:
i • Switching valve. Two Orbiter hydraulic systems are
connected to the valve• The output from the valve connects
to four servovalves and to a power spool. The valve will
shift position when the hydraulic pressure of the
controlling system is less than 1200 to 1500 psi and will
furnish standby pressure to the actuator.
. Four electro-hydraulic servovalves. Each servovalve
consists of a second-stage valve, a torque motor assembly
with power valve feedback wire, a mechanical position
feedback spring cage assembly, a bypass valve, a dynamic
pressure feedback valve, and a secondary delta pressure
transducer. The function of the servovalve is to generate
secondary hydraulic pressure to drive a power spool valve in
response to position commands from the ATVC electronic
driver.
•
•
Torque motor assembly. The assembly consists of dual
magnets, a flapper valve and two feedback wires attached to
the flapper; one wire is linked to the servovalve and the
other is linked to the power spool valve. The wires are
used to control the spool velocity, when a command voltage
generates a torque, it causes the flapper to rotate in a
clockwise or counterclockwise direction causing a pressure
buildup in either the right or left sections of the
servovalve, thus moving the valve to the right or left.
When the valve is displaced, the hydraulic pressure is
transferred to the power spool which then transfers
hydraulic pressure to the primary drive piston.
Mechanical position feedback assembly. The assembly links
each of the four torque motor flappers to the primary
piston. The assembly allows the flapper to rotate initially
in response to a command voltage input, and then
mechanically moves the flapper back to its neutral position
as the primary piston reaches its commanded position•
. Bypass valve• The bypass valve isolates a servovalve when a
secondary delta pressure is determined to be bad by the
ATVC electronics. When an isolation command is issued to a
solenoid a piston shuttles against a spring. This allows
7
.,
,
hydraulic pressure to shuttle a second piston which inhibits
hydraulic flow from the servovalve to the power piston.
This equalizes pressure on both sides of the hydraulic
supply which allows the servovalve to float, thus isolating
it from the System.
Secondary delta pressure transducer. Each servovalve has a
transducer which measures the resistance its servovalve sees
relative to the other three servovalves. It sends signals
to the ATVC electronics which determines which, if any,
delta pressure is outside allowable limits. If a delta
pressure fails, the TVC sends an isolation command to the
bypass valve.
Power spool valve assembly. Each actuator has one power
spool which provides primary hydraulic pressure to the
primary piston. The power spool consists of a cylinder that
contains a linear power spool. The power spool has a
central position whose motion is driven by the summation of
the secondary delta pressure from the four servovalves.
when the power spool is displaced, hydraulic fluid is
directed through a lock valve to the primary piston. The
lock valve hydraulically isolates the cylinder and primary
piston from the hydraulic source to prevent further movement
of the primary piston. If there is a hydraulic failure, the
lock valve spool moves (due to spring pressure) to a closed
position which locks the primary piston in its last
commanded position. A force limiter valve limits internal
cylinder pressure to 4050 psi. (The valve was used during
the OFT program to determine side loads during main engine
gimbaling.) The valve is functionally non-critical.
Instrumentation has been removed from the Orbiter.
Cylinder and ram/piston assembly. The assembly produces
linear motion (extend or retract) to move the SSME in pitch
and mechanical position feedback cam and a feedback scissor
assembly which connects to the mechanical position feedback
spring cage assembly. The main cylinder reservoirs receive
hydraulic pressure or return the Orbiter hydraulic supply
through the feedfrethrn lines leai_ to the power valve via
the lock valve. As the ram moves, the scissor assembly
contracts or expands, pushing the mechanical linkage (up or
down) which moves the torque motor flapper. When the
piston/cam reaches its commanded position, the feedback
assembly removes secondary fluid pressures to the power
valve.
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The ATVC servoactuators interface with the four ATVC electronics
drivers which receive commands via four MDMs from the four GPCs.
Crew initiated command inputs are through the GPCs. The crew can
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turn power on or off to any ATVC channel and place a FCS channel
in ORIDE which bypasses the ATVC fault detection circuitry.
Each actuator is fastended to the Orbiter thrust structures and
to the powerhead of one of the three SSMEs.
Crew inputs fall into three areas, rotational hand controller
(RHC) commands, override commands and ATVC power.
The FA MDMs and the ATVC electronic drives are located in
Avionics Bays 4, 5 and 6.
FCS channel monitor switches are located on Panel C3. The ATVC
power switches are located on Panel 017.
The two displays relative to MPS ATVC are the caution and warning
(C&W) matrix (Panel FT) and the GNC System Summary 1 display.
The GNC System Summary 1 display (PASS and BFS) shows a down
arrow for an FCS channel that has isolated a failed servovalve
and a fault message.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 3 is a block diagram of the ATVC servo actuators. Figures
4 through 8 show components which were analyzed for failure
modes.
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Figure 3 - ATVC sERVOACTUATOR BLOCK
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Figure 5 - ELECTROHYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
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Figure 7 - POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSEMBLY
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PISTON/RAM ASSEMBLY
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities.
I
i
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and CriticalitiesTABLE I
Criticality: 1/1
0 Servo- 2
Actuator
Hydraulic
valve Module
EH Servovalve -
Filter 1
Bypass Valve
Secondary
Delta P
Transducer
Power Spool
Valve 1
Check valve 1
Lock Valve 2
Force Limiter
Valve
Dynamic Press.
Feedback valve -
Switch Valve
Flow Cutoff
Primary Piston
Assembly
Valve
Mechanical
Pos. Feedback 1
Cylinder and
Ram/Piston
Assembly 1
TOTAL 9
2/IR
1
4
n
w
o
1
7
2/2
w
w
m
3/IR
1
w
o
i
i
1
3/2R
w
w
n
w
u
m
I
1
1
1
2
2
TOTAL
3
4
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
26
m
m
mm
mm
m
J
mm
i
Critical failures which cause loss of the servoactuator were due
to loss of hydraulic fluid, gross and slow leaks, valve failures
due to contamination, clogged filters, loss of hydraulic
pressure, mechanical failures in servovalves and its mechanical
feedback mechanism and inability to detect failures by the ATVC
fault detection circuitry.
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Of the 26 failure modes analyzed, 16 failures were determined to
be Potential Critical Items (PCIs). A summary of the PCIs is
presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross reference
between each PCI and a specific worksheet in Appendix C.
+
TABLE II Summary of I0A Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
0 Servo-
Actuator
Hydraulic
Valve Module
EH Servovalve
Filter
Secondary
Delta P
Transducer
Power Spool
Valve
Check Valve
Lock Valve
Switch Valve
Primary Piston
Assembly
Mechanical
Pos. Feedback
Cylinder and
Ram/Piston
Assembly
TOTAL
i/i
2
I
1
1
1
2
m
1
2/IR 2/2
1
4
1
1
-- w
7
3/IR
m
D
m
w
D
3/2R TOTAL
- 3
- 4
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 2
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 16
4.1 Analysis Results - Servoactuator
Failures which were related to the Servoactuators as an entity
were first analyzed. Critical failures were due to loss of
hydraulic fluid, gross and slow leaks.
4.2 Analysis Results - Hydraulic valve Module
Components were individually analyzed. Most critical failures of
these components included loss of command signal input, valve
failure due to contamination, clogged filters and loss of
hydraulic pressure.
17
4.3 Analysis Results - Primary Piston Assembly
Critical failures were due to mechanical failures (fractures and
Jammed components).
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5.0 REFERENCES
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis• The documentation used included the following:
i •
e
3.
•
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
Thrust Vector Control Training Manual, MPS TV 2102,
10/19/85
Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, JSC 11174, 09/13/86
SD72-SH-0102 Definition Manual Mechanical System
Hydraulics, 10/28/75
RI Integrated Schematics (V570-580998, -58099)
Shuttle MML
FDF (Ascent)
OMRSD U58AGO, V79ATO, V58A00
GN&C Console Handbook JSC12843
Discussions with S/S Manager
Sketches, Drawings, Etc. Reviewed with S/S Manager
Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, NSTS
22206, I0 October 1986
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
w
ATVC
BFS
C&W
CIL
CRT
delta P
E-H Servo VLV
F
FCS
FMEA
GNC
GPC
HW
IOA
MDAC
MDM
METVC
ORIDE
PASS
RI
RHC
SSME
SRB
- Ascent Thrust Vector Control
- Backup Flight System
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Differential Pressure
- Electro-Hydraulic Servovalve
- Functional
- Flight Control System
- Failure Modes Effect Analysis
- Guidance Navigation and Control
- General Purpose Computer
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Thrust Vector Control
- Override
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Rockwell International
- Rotational Hand Controller
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Solid Rocket Booster
W
_mw
L]
L_
[]
E A-1
mm
,_
m
i
m
m_
_.m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Im
im
m
m
= :
w
w
m
APPENDIX B
w
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS• GROUND RULES• AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
• ForDefinitions contained in NSTS 22206 Instructions __ Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
a-mplificati0ns and addit oI_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-o--OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m-_function procedures• pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-I_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M__C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
powe'r-up"'a_--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS i (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00-_ober 1986, was employe--_-with the
following amp--[ifications a-nd additions.
l ,
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design speclfications/drawlngs.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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10.
11.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE" Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
ATVC Actuator - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
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This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
_to-m--6f-_ach sheet_-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
p - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
L
C-I
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
i01 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
COMPONENT RUPTURE DOWNSTREAM OF SWITCH VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (2EA. ENGINE)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: 1/l
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, SERVO VALVE, DYNAMIC PRESSURE FEEDBACK
ASS'Y, MANIFOLDS, FORCE LIMITER, CYLINDER ACTUATOR BODY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASCENT - THERE IS A LOSS OF TWO HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEMS WHICH
RESULTS IN LOSS OF CONTROL. THIS IS A SINGLE FAILURE POINT WHERE
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR CYLINDER RUPTURE.
ENTRY - ENGINES CAN NOT BE POSITIONED, WHICH RESULTS IN POSSIBLE
ENGINE COLLISION, INTERFERENCES WITH BODY FLAP, OR CENTER ENGINE
PROJECTS INTO AIRSTREAM - LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (2EA_ _ ENGINE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3 / 3 RTLS : 1 / 1
LIFTOFF : 1/l TAL : i/i
ONORBIT : 3/ 3 AOA : 1 / 1
DEORBIT : i/i ATO : i/i
LANDING/SAFING : 3 / 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: LOSS OF PISTON ROD GLAND RETENTION IN BODY - LOSS OF 1
OR 3 DYNAMIC PRESSURE FEEDBACK ASSEMBLY RETENTION SCREWS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASCENT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF TWO HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS RESULTS IN LOSS
OF CONTROL.
DEORBIT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF TWO HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS TO ACTUATOR WHEN
ISO VALVE OPENED FOR ENGINE REPOSITIONING PRIOR TO ENTRY WHICH
MAY RESULT IN POSSIBLE ENGINE COLLISION AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (2EA. ENGINE)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE IN AND DOWNSTREAM OF SWITCH VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASCENT - LOSS OF SOME HYDRAULIC FLUID, HOWEVER THERE IS
INSUFFICIENT TIME TO DEPLETE A POWER SYSTEM - FULL CONTROL
CAPABILITY IS PROVIDED.
ENTRY - THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF AN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, HOWEVER
THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM PROVIDES ADEQUATE CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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g
g
w.w
= :
w
L
m
w
w
L
[]
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 104 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH VALVE (6)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER SUBSEQUENT TO LOSS OF ACTIVE
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN ENGINE TVC SERVO ACTUATOR
SWITCH VALVE
_ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
_ING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATION
C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE :
LOSS OF USE OF STANDBY SYSTEM TO GIMBAL ENGINE AND ENGINE WILL
_LO_-UP"_f_ __S_T_P_)S_f0M_W_}I X_)S=S_L_ ENGINE COLLISION AND
PoSsIBLE_LOSS OF MISSI0_N__CLE-FCREW_ (REOUIREE-2 FAILURES, LOSS
OF ACTIVE HYD- SYS. _ FA_L TO TR_SFER.
ALSO CONDITIONS MUST EXIST FOR _ESGI_°COLLISION).
=_
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY
SERVOVALVE FAILURE ONE CHANNEL HARDOVER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN ENGINE TVC SERVO ACTUATOR
2) EH SERVOVALVE ASSY (4EA. ACT)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015 .........
CAUSES: LOSS OF CMD. SIGNAL, DEFECTIVE TORQUE MOTOR, BLOCKED
METERING ORIFICE, LOOSE NOZZLE/FLAPPER, BROKEN FEEDBACK WIRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - REMAINING 3 CHANNELS FOR CONTROL (2 CHANNELS CAN OVERRIDE
1 FAILED CHANNEL) VEHICLE LOSS _TER3_FAILURES. HOWEVER THE
FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION RECONFIGURATION FUNCTION IN ATVC
AVIONICS IS INHIBITED DURING IST 2-3 SEC. OF ENGINE IGNITION
IF 2ND FAILURE OCCURS DURING TIME PERIOD - THERE ISAPOSSIBLE
LOSS OF CONTROL AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
106 ABORT:
h_DW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY
SERVOVALVE FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MAIN ENGINE TVC SERVO ACTUATOR
2) EH SERVOVALVE ASSY (4EA. ACT)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
CAUSES: LOSS OF SIGNAL, ELECTRICAL OPEN (ATVC DRIVER FAIL OR
ERRONEOUS ATVC OUTPUT) DEFECTIVE TORQUE MOTOR, JAMMED SPOOL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL, HOWEVER TWO FAILURES ARE
REQUIRED BEFORE A CONTROL PROBLEM EXISTS. IF FAILURE OCCURS
DURING NULL COMMANDING OR DURING A LOW VARYING RATE, THE ATVC
DRIVER CANNOT DETECT THE FIRST FAILURE.
FAILURES DURING DYNAMIC CONDITIONS ARE DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER
NO FLOWTO SERVOVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYSLEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN ENGINE TVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY (4EA. ACT)
FILTER (lEA ACT.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
CAUSES: FILTER CLOGGED, EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACTUATOR FAILS HARDOVER WITH A POSSIBLE ENGINE COLLISION
WHICH RESULTS IN LOSS OF CONTROL AND LOSS OF VEHICLE CREW.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
108 ABORT:
iTEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER
FAILS TO FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN ENGINE TVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY (4EA. ACT)
FILTER (lEA ACT.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: RUPTURED FILTER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - 15 MICRON FILTER SIZED FOR VEHICLE LIFE - UPSTREAM 5
MICRON FILTER POP-UP INDICATOR (GROUND) - WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW
CONTAMINATION TO JAM ALL 4 SERVO VALVE SPOOLS' FAILURE HIGHLY
UNLIKELY.
NO KNOWN CONDITIONS COULD CAUSE THE 15 MICRON FILTER TO RUPTURE.
NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE MOTOR ASSY
MOTOR FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN ENGINE TVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY (4EA. ACT)
TORQUE MOTAR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
CAUSES: OPEN, SHORT IN MOTOR WINDINGS, LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM ATVC.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF i OF 4 CHANNELS. FAILURE IS 3/1R, HOWEVER, 2ND ATVC
FAILURE CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL IF UNDETECTED THEREFORE ATVC
FAILURE MODE IS 2/IR. (SEE MDAC ID 105 & 106)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: ii0 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TORQUE MOTAR ASSY
FAILURE MODE: FLAPPER FAILS TO CLOSE OFF ORIFICE TO DIRECT H-YD.
PRESS. TO SERVOVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN ENGINE TVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY (4EA. ACT)
TORQUE MOTAR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: FLAPPER JAMMED, BROKEN (FATIGUE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS oF 1 OF 4CHANNELS_ _ _iSEE MDAC_iD 106)
REFERENCES:
L
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I_EPE_ENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_YSIS WORKS_ET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
10/02/86 HIG_ST _ITI_LITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
iii ABORT:
_W/FUNC
i/i
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ME_I_L POSITION FEEDBACK SPRING _GE ASSY
NO POSITION FEEDBACK
L_ __: R. WILSON SUBSYS LE_: J. RICCIO
BR_DO_ HI__:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR
SERVOVALVE ASSY
MEn. POS. FDBK - SPRING _GE ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDU_CY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LO_TION:
P_T _MBER:
ORBITER TRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
_USES: FEEDBACK ME_ISM J_MED OR SEP_TED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
ASCENT - ACTUATOR FAILS HARD OVER WITH A POSSIBLE ENGINE
COLLISION AND LOSS OF CONTROL. ORBIT - NO EFFECT, SYSTEM IS
ISOLATED, REAMINING SYSTEM PROVIDES ENGINE POSITIONING
CAPABILITY.
ENTRY - NO_, ADEQUATE ENGI_ POSITIONING.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
ll2 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE
VALVE FAILS TO ISOLATE FAILED SERVOVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY (4EA ACT)
BYPASS VALVE (4EA ACT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015 .
CAUSES: JAMMED SPOOL, ELECTRICAL OPEN TO SOLENOID, LOSS OF ATVC
DRIVE, ERRONEOUS ATVC OUTPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ISOLATION OF DEFECTIVE CHANNEL - 4 FAILURES ARE REQUIRED
BEFORE A CONTROL PROBLEM EXISTS (2 SERVOVALVES HARD OVER AND 2
RELATED ISO VLV OPEN).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-13
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECONDARY DELTA-P TRANSDUCER
FAILS TO SENSE DELTA-P
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO VALVE
EH SERVOVALVE ASSY
SEC. DELTA-P X-DUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621n0015
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE LVDT, ELECTRICAL OPEN, LOSS OR ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT ATVC, JAMMED PISTON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ISOLATION OF DEFECTIVE (_L LOSS OF CONTROL WITH
LOSS OF VEHICLE/_REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES (2 SERVOVALVES
HARDOVER PLUS 2 DELTA-P TRANSDUCERS FAIL).
IF A FAILURE OCCURS DURING NULL COMMANDS OR AT A LOW VARYING
RATE, THE ATVC DRIVER CANNOT DETECT FAILURE, THEREFORE A
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE DURING DYNAMIC CONDITIONS WOULD LEAVE 2
CHANNELS OPERATIONAL.
HOWEVER, THE ASA CANNOT ISOLATE WHICH OF THE LAST TWO CHANNELS
FAILED. THIS WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY
POWER VALVE SPOOOL JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) METVC SERVO VALVE
2) POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY (lEA ACT)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 1/l
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACTUATOR FAILS HARDOVER RESULTING IN A POSSIBLE ENGINE COLLISION
AND LOSS OF CONTROL WHICH RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
ASCENT - ABORT DECISION
REFERENCES:
r_
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-15
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) METVC SERVO ACT (6)
2) POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY (lEA ACT)
3) CHECK VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/1
i/i
i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
C [NA ]
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE TO POWER SPOOL VALVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF CONTROL
OF ONE ENGINE WITH A POSSIBLE ENGINE COLLISION RESULTING. THIS
RESULTS IN LOSS OF CONTROL AND POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH BODY
FLAP DURING ENTRY.
ASCENT - ABORT UNLESS ORBIT CAN BE ACHIEVED.
REFERENCES:
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DATE :
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID :
INDEPE_ENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIG_ST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
116 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) METVC SERVO ACT (6)
2) POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY (IEA ACT)
3) CHECK VALVE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. WITH A NORMAL SYSTEM THERE IS ONLY A SLOWLY DECREASING
PRESSURE LOSS. C&W LIGHT IS ACTIVATED AT 2750 +i00 PSI WHICH IS
SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN ACTUATOR POSITION C&W LIGHT ON. PILOT
ACTION/DECISION TO DEACTIVATE FAILING SYSTEM. AUTO-SWITCH TO
REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THIS FAILURE MODE IS NON FUNCTIONALLY
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCK VALVE
FAILS IN CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACT (6)
POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY (IEA ACT)
LOCK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/I ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/l
1/l
i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: JAMMED, SPOOL CONTAMINATION, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASCENT - NO EFFECT-VLV IS VERIFIED OPEN IN PRE-LAUNCH BY PROPER
SYSTEM FUNCTION. D0-POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION, CREW, VEHICLE DUE
TO RESULTING CONTROL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON ENGINE POSITION.
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO POSITION ENGINE FOR
ENTRY .....................................
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT 0RBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/0:2/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
118 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCK VALVE
FAILS IN OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACT (6)
POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY (IEA ACT)
LOCK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _HDW/FUNC _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: ......i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: - ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
CAUSES: JAMMED SPOOL, BROKEN SPRING SEAL FAILURE. INTERNAL
LEAKAGE (PAST PISTON SEAL) EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (PAST PISTON ROD
SEAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
ASCENT - NOT APPLICABLE/gALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN AND ACTUATOR IS
IN A DYNAMIC MODE WHICH COMPENSATES FOR LEAKAGE.
DEORBIT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION, VEHICLE, CREW. FAILURE COULD
POSSIBLY LEAVE ENGINE iN POSITION TO INTERFERE WITH BODY FLAP.
UPPER ENGI_ WOULD PROJECT i_O _AIR STREAM RESULTING iN A
POSSIBLE CONTROL PROBLEM.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
i19 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FORCE LIMITER VALVE
VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACT (6)
POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY (IEA ACT)
FORCE LIMITER VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATION, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - ADEQUATE CONTROL CAPABILITY EXISTS. THIS FAILURE IS
FUNCTIONALLY NON-CRITICAL SINCE AN OPEN VALVE WOULD NOT DEGRADE
ACTUATOR PERFORMANCE. CONDITIONS_MU--ST EXIST TOCAUSE VAL_ _ TO
OPEN ARE NON-CREDIBLE.
NOTE: DESIGNED TO LIMIT CYLINDER PRESSURE TO 4050 PSIA. VALVE
WAS INSTRUMENTED DURING OFT PROGRAM. HAS SINCE BEEN REMOVED FROM
ORBITER .. (SERVO ACTUATOR DESIGNED TO 9000 PSIA, ATP TO 4500
PSIA).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
120 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FORCE LIMITER V_VE
VALVE FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACT (6)
POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY (IEA ACT)
FORCE LIMITER VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE ;_HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-00i5
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATION, EXCESSIVE SPOOL SLEEVE FRICTION,
BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
....ASCENT - NONE, VALVE IS NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING MAIN
ENGi_= BU_S_ .....OFT _FLIG_ _ DAT-A _SHOED ACTUATOR- -S_DE LOADS-_E
WELL BELOW ATTACH POINT LIMITS AND LOAD RELIEF VALVE IS NOT
ACTIVATED UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC FLIGHT: 1/l
MDAC ID: 121 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: CYLINDER AND RAM/PISTON ASS'Y
FAILURE MODE: FRACTURE OF TAIL STOCK (THRUST, STRUCTURE), PISTON
ROD END (ENGINE), PISTON HEAD, PISTON ROD
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) METVC SERVO ACT (6)
2) CYLINDER AND RAM/PISTON ASSY.
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAD: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSEs: MATERIAL DEFECT_ FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASCENT - LOSS OF ENGINE GIMBAL CONTRQL_ ........._ .... _...._....
ENTRY - LOSS OF ABILITY TO MAINTAIN EN_I_OSITION CAN_LT IN
POSSIBLE ENGINE COLLISION. ENGINE CAN PROJECT INTO AIRSTREAM OR
INTERFERE WITH BODY FLAP WHICH RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CONTROL.
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I_EPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DYNAMIC PRESSURE FEEDBACK VALVE
SPOOL FAILS TO SHUTTLE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) METVC SERVO ACT (6
2) EH SERVO VALVE ASSY. (4 EA. ACT.)
3) DYNAMIC PRESSURE FDBK. VLV. (4 EA. ACT.)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLI_ PHASE _ HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BROKEN SPRING JAMS SPOOL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
NO EFFECT-OTHER 3 VALVES WOULD RESPOND TO PRESSURE FLUCTUATIONS
RESULTING FROM ME VIBRATIONS CAUSING ACTUATOR MAIN PISTON/RAM TO
SLI_y___O-_ET_CT_ _, ............ , ...... ....
LOSS OF 1 OR ALL IF THE DYNAMIC FEEDBACK VALVES HAS NO EFFECT ON
CONTROLLABILITY OF THE ME SERVO ACTUATORS. THIS FAILURE IS
FUNCTIONALLY NON-CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DYNAMIC PRESSURE FEEDBACK VALVE
SPOOL FAILS TO RETURN TO NULL
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
METVC SERVO ACT (6)
EH SERVO VALVE ASSY. (4 EA. ACT.)
DYNAMIC PRESSURE FDBK. VLV. (4 EA. ACT.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
MC621-0015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BROKEN SPRING JAMS SPOOL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT-OTHER 3 VALVES WOULD PREVENT UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF POWER
SPOOL DUE TO PRESSURE FROM FAILED DYNAMIC FEEDBACK VALVE.
LOSS OF 1 OR ALL OF THE VALVES HAS NO EFFECT ON CQNTROLABILITY OF
THE ACTUATORS. THIS FAILURE IS FUNCTIONALLY NON-CRITICAL.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86
ATVC
124
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) METVC SERVO ACT (6)
2) FLOWCUTOFF VALVES (i EA. ACT.)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
o
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION POPPET JAMMED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS UPSTREAM OF STANDBY HYDRAULIC LINE TO SWITCHING VALVE.
VALVE IS CLOSED WITH PRESSURE ABOVE 350-PSIG AND IS USED TO
CIRCULATE (WARM) HYD. FLUID IN STANDBY LINE. ASCENT - MINOR LOSS
OF SYSTEM POWER AVAILABLE DUE TO BYPASSING
FLUID. HAS ESSENTIALLY NO EFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION. DEORBIT -
NO EFFECT. TVC ISO VALVES ARE CLOSED EXCEPT FOR PERIOD OF ENGINE
REPOSITIONING. THIS FAILURE IS FUNCTIONALLY NON-CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
I
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATVC FLIGHT:
!25 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) METVC SERVO ACT (6)
2) FLOWCUTOFF VALVES (1 EA. ACT.)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER THRUST STRUCTURE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION POPPED JAMMED FRACTURES SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE IS OPEN DURING LOW PRESSURE OPERATION ONLY. THERE IS A
LOSS OF SYSTEM CAPABILITY TO THERMALLY CONDITION STANDY HYD.
SYSTEM AT_FECTEDACTU6TpR: THERE IS NO EFFECT SINCE STDBY
SYSTEM WILL FUNCTION NORMALLY ONCE IT IS FUNCTIONING AS
THE PRIMARY SOURCE. THE FAILURE EFFECT IS TEMPORARY AND NON-
CRITICAL. DEORBIT - NO EFFECT. TVC ISO VALVES ARE CLOSED EXCEPT
DURING ENGINE REPOSITIONING. NOTE: VALVE OPERATES ONLY_ 2
CIRCULATION PUMPS ARE RUNNING IN PRE-LAUNCH AND POST-LANDING.
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
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MDAC ID
i01
102
103
104
105
106
107
109
ll0
iii
113
114
115
117
118
121
ITEM
METVC Servoactuator
METVC Servoactuator
METVC Servoactuator
Switch Valve
E-H Servovalve
E-H Servovalve
Filter
Torque Motor Ass'y.
Torque Motor Ass'y.
Mechanical Position
Feedback Spring Cage
Assembly
Secondary Delta P
Transducer
Power Spool
Check valve
Lock Valve
Lock Valve
Cylinder and Ram/
Piston Assembly
i
FAILURE MODE
Component rupture downstream
of switch valve
External leakage
Internal leakage
Fails to transfer
Fail one channel hardover
One channel fail
No flow to servovalve
Motor fails
Flapper fails
No position feedback
Fail to service Delta P
Jammed
Fails closed
Fails closed
Fails open
Fracture
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